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I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the federal
district courts to serve process either in accordance with a federal statute or
"under the circumstances" in which the long-arm statute of the state where the
district court is located permits service.' Although the United States Code
contains countless statutes that provide remedies at federal law, service is
authorized by an accompanying federal statute in only a few of these.2 As a
result, the long-arm statute of the state where the federal district court is located
must be borrowed to serve the defendant with process in the overwhelming
number of federal question cases.'
This comment will explore whether the "under the circumstances" language
in Rule 4(e) requires a defendant in a federal question case to have minimum
contacts4 with the state whose long-arm statute is used to accomplish service.
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeal are split over this issue. The First,
Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have determined that the "under the
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) provides:
Whenever a statute of the United States ... provides for service of a summons ... upon
a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court is held,
service may be made under the circumstances -and in the manner prescribed by the
statute .... Whenever a statute ... of the state in which the district court is held
provides ... for service of a summons ... upon a party not an inhabitant of or found
within the state ... service may in either case be made under the circumstances and in
the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
2. For example, a federal statute authorizes service of process for actions brought under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78), the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77), the
Clayton Anti-Trust Act (15 U.S.C. § 22), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(18 U.S.C. § 1965), the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. §
I I32(e)(2)) and in Bankruptcy Actions (11 U.S.C. Rule 7004(d)).
3. Article I11, § 2 of the United States Constitution grants federal courts with jurisdiction to
hear cases "arising under" the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties. This is known
as federal question jurisdiction. Congress has conferred this jurisdiction upon the lower federal courts
by statute. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 permits federal district courts to exercise federal question
subject matter jurisdiction in "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." Also, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 vests federal district courts with federal question subject
matter jurisdiction in admiralty. And, Article Il, § 2 permits federal district courts to hear cases
between citizens of different states. This is known as diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 vests
the lower federal courts with diversity jurisdiction. The law that determines the rights of the parties
in diversity cases is state law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S. Ct. 817. 822
(1938); 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
4. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
circumstances language" in Rule 4(e) requires a defendant in a federal question
case to have minimum contacts with the state where the federal district court is
located.5 The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have reached the opposite conclusion;
namely, that Rule 4(e) does not require a defendant in a federal question case to
have minimum contacts with the forum state. 6
A brief discussion of the due process restraints placed upon the exercise of
personal jurisdiction will bring the present issue into focus.
A. Personal Jurisdiction: The Minimum Contacts Test
Before a state court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, due process
requires that the defendant have "certain minimum contacts" with the state so
that "the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' '  When a federal court exercises diversity jurisdiction,
the plaintiff's cause of action is based upon state law.8 As the United States
Supreme Court has stated, "a federal court adjudicating a state-created right
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose,
in effect, only another court of the State." 9 For this reason, it is uniformly
accepted that a federal district court sitting in diversity is bound by the same
jurisdictional constraints that a state court is.10 Thus, a defendant in a diversity
5. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085-86
(1st Cir. 1992); Lorelei Corp. v. County of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717, 720 (1st Cir. 1991); Max
Daetwyler Corp. v R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 295-97 (3d Cir. 1985); DeJames v. Magnificence
Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284-86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085, 102 S. Ct. 642 (1981);
DeMelo v. Toche Marine, 711 F.2d 1260, 1266 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Damodar Bulk Carriers, Ltd.,
903 F.2d 675, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1990); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406,
418 (9th Cir. 1977); Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prod., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855-56
& n.39 (11th Cir. 1990).
6. Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Oil
Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); United Rope Distribs., Inc. v.
Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 1991). In April of 1993, the United States
Supreme Court proposed an amendment to Rule 4(e). Proposed Rule 4(e)(1) provides:
Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual ... may be effected
in any judicial district of the United States pursuant to the law of the state in which the
district court is located, or in which service is effected, for the service of summons upon
the defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state.
Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 409-10 (1993). If Congress fails to act, the revision will
become effective on December 1, 1993. Although Proposed Rule 4(e) does not contain the troubling
"under the circumstances" language, the "pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court
is located" does not clarify whether a defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state
in a federal question case.
7. international Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 158.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
9. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 1469-70 (1945).
10. Mellon Bank (East) P.S.F.S., Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992);
Command-Aire Corp. v. Ontario Mechanical Sales & Serv., Inc., 963 F.2d 90. 93-94 (5th Cir. 1992);
Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1459 (6th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip.
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case must have minimum contacts with the state where the federal district court
is located."
In a federal question case, the federal district court exercises the sovereign
power of the United States and applies federal law to determine the rights and
liabilities of the parties. In Federal Trade Commission v. Jim Walter Corp.,2
the Fifth Circuit was asked to determine whether due process required a
defendant in a federal question case to have minimum contacts with the United
States in general or with the particular state where the federal district court was
located. Jim Walter was a Florida-based company; nonetheless, The Federal
Trade Commission filed suit against it in Texas. Although Jim Walter lacked
minimum contacts with Texas, it had minimum contacts with the United
States. 3 The Fifth Circuit held that minimum contacts with the United States
was sufficient to satisfy due process in a federal question suit. Since "each
federal court exercises 'the judicial power of the United States,"' the Fifth
Circuit concluded that "due process requires only that a defendant in a federal
[question] suit have minimum contacts with the United States, 'the sovereign that
has created the court.""
4
B. Does Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Require a
Defendant in a Federal Question Case to Have Minimum Contacts with the
State Whose Long-Arm Statute is Used to Serve the Defendant with Process?
All of the other circuits that have considered what the due process test
should be in a federal question case have reached the same conclusion that the
Fifth Circuit did in Jim Walter; namely, that due process is. satisfied in a federal
question case if the defendant has minimum contacts with the United States. 5
Nevertheless, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal are split over whether
the "under the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e) imposes the additional
requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with the state whose long-
Co., 927 F.2d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 1991); Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d
369, 372-73 (8th Cir. 1990); Charlie Fowler Evangelistic Association, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
911 F.2d 1564, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990); Koteen v. Bermuda Cablevision Ltd., 913 F.2d 973, 974-75
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Ganis Corp. v. Jackson, 822 F.2d 194, 196 (1st Cir. 1987); John Walker & Sons,
Ltd. v. DeMert & Dougherty, Inc., 821 F.2d 399, 401-04 (7th Cir. 1987); Corporate Inv. Business
Brokers v. Melcher, 824 F.2d 786, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1987); Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc.,
575 F.2d 1017, 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); Ajax Realty Corp. v. J. F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818, 822 (4th
Cir. 1972).
11. See supra note 10.
12. 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
13. Id. at 256.
14. Id.
15. Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1089, 11 S. Ct. 968 (1991); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 n.4 (7th Cir. 1979);
Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1985); Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d
816, 824-25 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949, 102 S. Ct. 1450 (1982); Mariash v. Morrill,
496 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1974).
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arm statute is used to serve the defendant with process in a federal question
case. 16
In Burstein v. State Bar of California,7 the Fifth Circuit was asked to
consider this issue. Burstein, a Louisiana resident, had taken the California bar
exam. After the California State Bar notified Burstein that she had failed the
multi-state and the essay portions of the test, she filed suit in federal district
court in Louisiana. She alleged that the Bar had violated her rights to due
process and equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8 Burstein was a federal
question case, as Jim Walter was. Under the rationale of Jim Walter, due
process would have been satisfied because the Bar had minimum contacts with
the United States. However, in Jim Walter a federal statute was used to serve
Jim Walter with process. By contrast, there was no federal statute in Burstein
that authorized service of process for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Thus, under Rule 4(e), the only means available to serve the Bar with process
was the Louisiana long-arm statute.
Since "minimum contacts" with the state is a "circumstance" that must exist
before a state court can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, the Fifth Circuit
in Burstein concluded that the "under the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e)
requires a defendant in a federal question case to have minimum contacts with
the state whose long-arm statute is used to serve process. 9 Since the Bar
lacked minimum contacts with Louisiana, the Fifth Circuit held that the district
court could not exercise jurisdiction over the Bar.
Although the Fifth Circuit is joined by the First, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits in this interpretation of Rule 4(e),20 the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have
determined that Rule 4(e) does not require the defendant to have minimum
contacts with the state."1 In Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.,22
the plaintiff sued under the Jones Act. 3 Since the Jones Act did not contain
a provision that authorized service of process, Rule 4(e) required that the state
long-arm statute be used to serve process. The Sixth Circuit held that the "under
the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e) did not compel the defendant to have
minimum contacts with the forum state when the defendant was served under the
state long-arm statute in a federal question case.24 The Sixth Circuit concluded
that the "under the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e) referred to the laundry
list of circumstances that are typically enumerated in state long-arm statutes
16. See supra notes 5 and 6.
17. 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
18. Id. at 513.
19. Id. at 517.
20. See supra note 5.
21. See supra note 6.
22. 732 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1984).
23. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988).
24. Handley, 732 F.2d at 1272.
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under which the state legislature had authorized service of process.25 The
"circumstance" in this case was the "contracting to supply services or goods in
this Commonwealth" provision in the long-arm statute. Thus, the court
determined that the defendant could be served with process because the
plaintiff's claim arose from the acts of the defendant in "contracting to supply
services or goods in this Commonwealth" in accordance with the Kentucky long-
arm statute.26 Since the "contracting to supply services or goods in this
Commonwealth" language had been interpreted to allow the assertion of
jurisdiction over any defendant who had minimum contacts with the state in a
diversity case,27 the court concluded that the long-arm statute could be used to
assert jurisdiction over any defendant who had minimum contacts with the
United States in a federal question case. 8 Thus, the Sixth Circuit determined
that personal jurisdiction could be exercised over the defendant even though the
defendant did not have minimum contacts with the state. The Seventh Circuit
has reached the same conclusion in United Rope Distributors, Inc. v. Seatriumph
Marine, Corp.29 and In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz.3 °
This comment will assess the split among the circuits over whether the
"under the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e) requires a defendant to have
minimum contacts with a particular state in a federal question case. As
discussed above, due process requires only that a defendant in a federal question
case have minimum contacts with the United States in general. Thus, the issue
is whether Rule 4(e) imposes the requirement that a defendant have minimum
contacts with the forum state, a requirement that is not mandated by the
Constitution.
First, this comment will examine Omni Capital International v. Rudolf Wolff
& Co.,3 the most recent decision by the United States Supreme Court that
addressed service of process in federal question cases. Next, the interplay of
Rules 4(f), 4(d), and 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
national contacts doctrine will be explored. This comment will consider the case
law of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, which have declined to interpret the
language of Rule 4(e) to require minimun contacts with a particular state. Then,
this comment will assess the jurisprudence of the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits that, has construed Rule 4(e) to require a defendant to have
minimum contacts with the forum state.
25. Id.
26. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 454.210(2)(a)(2) (Baldwin 1991). quoted in Handley, 732 F.2d at
1270.
27. Handley, 732 F.2d at 1271 (citing Poyner v. Erma Werke GMBH, 618 F.2d. 1186, 1192
(6th Cir. 1980)).
28. Handley, 732 F.2d at 1272.
29. 930 F.2d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 1991).
30. 954 F.2d 1279, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
31. 484 U.S. 97, 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987).
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As will be discussed, the use of state long-arm statutes in federal question
cases presents problems in obtaining jurisdiction over alien defendants. Also, the
use of state long-arm statutes in federal question cases prevents the uniform
application of federal law. These problems can be rectified if Congress enacts a
federal statute that permits world-wide service of process in federal question cases.
However, the liberal venue provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. §
1391 (c) would permit a plaintiff who uses a world-wide service of process statute
to obtain proper venue in an action against a corporate defendant in any district in
the United States. An unfettered choice of venue would encourage forum shopping.
Nevertheless, this problem can be resolved by amending the venue provision in 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c).
II. OMNI CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL V. RUDOLF WOLFF & CO.
In Omni, Omni Capital International and Omni Capital Corporation (two New
York corporations) were approached by James Gourlay on behalf of Rudolf Wolff
& Co., Ltd. (a British Corporation). The Omni companies agreed to allow Rudolf
Wolff to serve as their broker on the London Metals Exchange. In the United
States, the Omni companies marketed their investment program, which included the
commodities handled by Rudolf Wolff. The advertisements proclaimed that
participation in the investment program would result in federal income tax
deductions.32
The Internal Revenue Service, however, determined that the trading on the
London Metals Exchange had not been at arm's-length and that some members of
the London Metals Exchange were engaged in price fixing. Because the investment
program sponsored by the Omni companies included the commodities trading on
the London Metals Exchange, the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the
deductions that had been claimed by the participants in the Omni investment
program. Shortly thereafter, some of the investors filed suit in the Eastern District
of Louisiana. The plaintiffs' initial complaints alleged violations of section 17(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933, 3" sections 10b and 20 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,' SEC Rule lOb-5,35 and the Louisiana Blue Sky Laws.36 When
the Supreme Court recognized an implied private cause of action under the
Commodities Exchange Act,37 the plaintiffs amended their complaint to assert a
commodities claim under sections 4(b) and 9(b) of the CEA. 38 The district court
32. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1986).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988).
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78t (1988).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
36. Omnni, 484 U.S. at 100, 108 S. Ct. at 407.
37. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 102 S. Ct. 1825
(1982).




concluded that the CEA had preempted the plaintiffs' securities claims; therefore,
it dismissed these securities claims. 9
The Omni defendants moved to implead Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd. and James
Gourlay, a citizen and resident of England who was employed by Wolff to solicit
business from the Omni companies. 40 Initially, the district court determined that
it could exercise jurisdiction over the third-party defendants because it concluded
that Congress intended for the federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
alien defendants who were not present within the United States under the CEA if
due process would permit the exercise ofjurisdiction. The court concluded that the
"quality and nature" of the third-party defendants' contacts with the United States
were sufficient for the United States to assert jurisdiction consistently with due
process.4'
Upon rehearing, the district court judge considered the effect that the Fifth
Circuit's decision in DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc. 42 had upon its initial decision.
In DeMelo, the Fifth Circuit held that "when a federal question case is based upon
a federal statute that is silent as to service of process, and a state long-arm statute
is therefore utilized to serve an out-of-state defendant, Rule 4(e) requires that the
state's standard of amenability tojurisdiction apply. 43 Recognizing that the CEA
was silent about service of process in private causes of action, the district court in
Omni held that "unless jurisdiction can be asserted under the Louisiana long-arm
statute, there is no personal jurisdiction over Wolff or Gourlay." The district
court determined that the requirements of the Louisiana long-arm statute were not
met.45 Therefore, it dismissed all of the Omni defendants' third-party claims
against Wolff and Gourlay, because it concluded that it could not exercise in
personam jurisdiction over them.'
On appeal in Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital International, Ltd, the
Omni defendants did not contest the district court's finding that Wolff and Gourlay
were not amenable to service under the Louisiana long-arm statute. They argued
instead that the district court had erroneously determined that the CEA did not
provide an independent basis for extra-territorial service of process under Rule
39. Omni, 484 U.S. at 100, 108 S. Ct. at 407; Point Landing, 795 F.2d at 418.
40. Omni, 484 U.S. at 99-100, 108 S. Ct. at 407.
41. Id. at 100, 108 S. Ct. at 407-08.
42. 711 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1983).
43. Id. at 1266.
44. Omni, 484 U.S. at 101, 108 S. Ct. at 408.
45. The District Court concluded that the requirements of the Louisiana long-arm statute were
not met in this litigation. It determined that even La. R. S. 13:3201(d) (1968), which allows a court
to rely upon the effects that the defendant causes within the State, was "clearly not applicable"
because it "applies only to a defendant who 'regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered, in this state."' Id. at 108, 108 S. Ct. at 411. Id. at 103, 108 S. Ct. at 409.
46. Id. at 99-102, 108 S. Ct. at 407-08.
47. 795 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1986).
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4(e).4" The basis for the defendants' assertion was that the language of CEA
implicitly allowed for extra-territorial service.
The Fifth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court's determination that
the CEA had preempted the plaintiffs' securities claims and that service of process
could not be effected under the CEA since none of its provisions authorized extra-
territorial service.49  The Fifth Circuit explained that unlike the Securities
Exchange Act,50 which explicitly "permits service of process 'wherever the
defendant may be found,"' '. the CEA "is silent on the subject of process."52
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that authority for service could not be based
upon the CEA. 3
In Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., a panel of the Fifth Circuit suggested that it
was not necessary for the defendant to have minimum contacts with the state in a
federal question case when service was accomplished under the state's long-arm
statute. 55 In Burstein v. State Bar of California,56 which was decided only three
days after Lapeyrouse, another panel of the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant
must have minimum contacts with the state in a federal question suit when service
of process is accomplished under the state's long-arm statute.57 "[A] federal
court, even in a federal question case, can use a state long-arm statute only to reach
those parties whom a court of the state could also reach under it.""8 The Fifth
Circuit heard the Omni case en banc to determine whether Lapeyrouse or Burstein
was correct.
59
Nine of the fifteen judges in Point Landing voted to adopt the Burstein rule:
"Absent a rule or statute to the contrary, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)
permits a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over only those defendants who
are subject to the jurisdiction of courts of the state in which the court sits."'6
These judges maintained that the district court could only assert jurisdiction if
Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorized service of process.
Rule 4(e) permits service in accordance with either a federal statute or "under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by the long-arm statute of the state
where a federal district court sits.6' Since the CEA contained no express
48. Id. at 423.
49. Id. at 424.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78 aa.
51. Point Landing, 795 F.2d at 424.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 693 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled by Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd.,
795 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1986).
55. Id. at 586.
56. 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
57. Id. at 514.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 419 (citing DeMelo v. Toche Marine, 711 F.2d 1260, 1268 (5th Cir. 1983)).
60. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1986).
61. See supra note 1 for text of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
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provision that authorized service upon the third-party defendants, and since the
Omni defendants had not appealed the trial judge's ruling that Wolff and Gourlay
were not amenable to service under the Louisiana long-arm statute, these nine
judges concluded that the district court was unable to obtain in personam
jurisdiction over the third-party defendants.62 The majority succinctly conclud-
ed: "[W]e cannot blink at the language of Rule 4(e). We cannot read the rule
except as saying that absent specific congressional authority [in a federal statute],
a federal district court has no personal jurisdiction over a defendant who cannot
be reached by the long-arm statute of the state in which the district court sits." 63
However, six of the fifteen Fifth Circuit judges in Point Landing dissented
in part because they believed that the federal district court could obtain
jurisdiction over Wolff and Gourlay even though they were not amenable to
service under either the CEA or the Louisiana long-arm statute. The dissenters
argued that because the aggregate of the third-party defendants' national contacts
permitted the district court to assert jurisdiction consistently with due process,
then Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should not be construed to
preclude the exercise of jurisdiction that is constitutionally permissible. The
dissenters reached this conclusion by relying upon Rule 82 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provides: "These rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts ...."6 Moreover,
the dissenters argued that the majority's construction of Rule 4 led to the "unjust,
inconvenient, and expensive result of immunizing Wolff and Gourlay from
liability 65 in violation of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6
Thus, the dissenters concluded that Rule 83, which allows "district judges ...
[to] regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules, 67
62. 795 F.2d at 427.
63. Id.
64. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82. "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction
of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein."
65. Point Landing, 795 F.2d at 428 (Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1: "These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts
in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the
exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every activity."
67. Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 provides:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to time,
after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment, make and amend
rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. A local rule so adopted shall
take effect upon the date specified by the district court and shall remain in effect unless
amended by the district court or abrogated by the judicial council of the circuit in which
the district is located. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court shall
upon their promulgation be furnished to the judicial council and the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts and be made available to the public. In all cases not provided
for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner
not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which they act.
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would permit the district court to fashion an ad hoc rule for service of
process.68
The Supreme Court granted the Omni defendants' writ of certiorari.69
Once again, the Omni defendants argued that the CEA allowed extra-territorial
service of process. In the alternative, they asked the Supreme Court to adopt the
position of the six judges in Point Landing who dissented in part by allowing the
district court to create a common-law rule that would allow service upon the
third-party defendants. 70
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court concluded that "a nationwide
service provision for a private action was not implicit in the CEA. ' '71 More-
over, the Court rejected the position of the dissenters in Point Landing that the
district court should be allowed to create an ad hoc rule for service of process.
The Supreme Court explained that "[i]t seems likely that Congress has been
acting on the assumption that federal courts cannot add to the scope of service
of summons Congress has authorized."72 The Court reasoned that this long-
standing assumption supported the argument against allowing the district courts
to devise common-law rules to serve process because the federal courts could use
these common-law rules to go beyond the limits Congress has placed upon the
service power of the federal courts. Also, the Supreme Court concluded that the
legislature, rather than the courts, was the appropriate body to fashion a service
rule."
Adopting the position of the majority in Point Landing, the Supreme Court
held that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must authorize service
of process. "[U]nder Rule 4(e), a federal court normally looks either to a federal
statute or to the long arm statute of the State in which it sits ... Because
the Supreme Court determined that the CEA did not authorize service, and
because the Omni companies had not appealed the district court's determination
that Wolff and Gourlay were not amenable to service under the Louisiana long-
arm statute, the Court held that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over
these third-party defendants.75
In Onni, the defendants had asked the Supreme Court to extend the state
minimum contacts doctrine76 by analogy to the federal courts, thereby permit-
68. Point Landing, 795 F.2d at 434.
69. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 479 U.S. 1063, 107 S. Ct. 946 (1987).
70. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103, 108 S. Ct. 404, 409.
71. Id. at 108, 108 S. Ct. at 411.
72. Id. at 109, 108 S. Ct. at 412.
73. Id. at 110, 108 S. Ct. at 412-13.
74. Id. at 105, 108 S. Ct. at 410.
75. Id. at 104, 108 S. Ct. at 409.
76. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945),.the
Supreme Court formulated the test to assess the constitutionality of an exercise of in personam
jurisdiction by a state court. The defendant must have "certain minimum contacts" with the state so
that "the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310. 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945), citing
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ting the federal district court to consider the third-party defendants' contacts with
the United States as a whole." However, since the Supreme Court had
determined that service upon the third-party defendants was not permitted under
the CEA, and since the Omni defendants had conceded that Wolff and Gourlay
could not be reached under the Louisiana long-arm statute, the Court concluded
that it had "no occasion 'to consider the constitutional issues raised by [the
national contacts] theory."' 78
After Omni the question that remains unanswered is whether the "under the
circumstances" language in Rule 4(e) statutorily requires a defendant in a federal
question case to have minimum contacts with the state where the district court
is located when service is accomplished under the forum state's long-arm statute.
Uncertainty remains over the requirements that this language in Rule 4(e)
imposes even though five circuits have held that a consideration of the
defendant's national contacts in a federal question case is constitutionally
permissible. 9
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have concluded that Rule 4(e) does not
require an analysis of the defendant's contacts with the state. These two circuits
have determined that if the acts or omissions of the defendant are enumerated in
the state's long-arm statute and if the defendant has minimum contacts with the
United States, then the federal court may assert jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.s° By contrast, the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
interpreted Rule 4(e) to legislatively impose a state standard of amenability to
jurisdiction upon the federal courts in federal question cases when a state long-
arm statute is used to serve process.8' Thus, the defendant must have minimum
contacts with the forum state.
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 343 (1940).
77. Omni, 484 U.S. at 102 n.5, 108 S. Ct. at 409 n.5.
78. Id. (quoting Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102. 113
n.*, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1032 n.* (1987)).
79. Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1974); FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651
F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 824-26 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949, 102 S. Ct. 1450 (1982); Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Sugar, 913
F.2d 1233, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1089. 111 S. Ct. 968 (1991); Fitz3immons
v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 n.4 (7th Cir. 1979); Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir.
1985).
80. Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Oil
Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); United Rope Distribs. v. Seatriumph
Marine, 930 F.2d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 1991).
81. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085-86
(1st Cir. 1992); Lorelei Corp. v. County of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717, 720 (1st Cir. 1991); Max
Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 295-97 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980, 106 S. Ct.
383 (1985); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284-86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1085, 102 S. Ct. 642 (1981); Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th
Cir. 1982); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977);




III. THE INTERPLAY OF RULES 4(F), 4(D), AND 4(E) OF THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE NATIONAL CONTACTS DOCTRINE
Although an extension of the minimum contacts test by analogy to the
United States would seem to empower a federal district court to obtain personal
jurisdiction over any defendant who has minimum contacts with the United
States, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limits the jurisdictional
reach of the federal district courts. Although Rule 4 is phrased in terms of
service of process, a restriction upon the ability of a court to serve process
necessarily limits its jurisdictional reach. As the First Circuit explained in
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp.,
service of process and personal jurisdiction are "inextricably intertwined, since
service of process is the vehicle by which the court obtains jurisdiction."82
As a general principle, Rule 4(f) authorizes service only within the state
where the court is located. 3  Under 4(d)(1), an individual defendant who is
amenable to service under Rule 4(t) can be served "by delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to the individual personally" within the forum
state." Although it is easy to ascertain if an individual defendant is physically
present within the forum state, the "corporate personality is a fiction, . . . [and]
it is clear that unlike an individual its [presence] ... without, as well as within,
the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf
by those who 'are authorized to act for it."' 85 For this reason, Rule 4(d)(3) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a corporation may be served
by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint "to an officer, a
managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or
"816by law to receive service of process ....
82. 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st Cir. 1992).
83. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) states: "All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere
within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by
a statute of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state." However,
Rule 14 (third party defendants) or Rule 19 (necessary parties) parties may be served if they are
found within one hundred miles of the courthouse-regardless of state lines.
84. According to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), service shall be made: "Upon an individual other than
an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
the individual personally ...."
85. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945)
(citation omitted). For a discussion of corporate "presence" in the wake of Burnham v. Superior
Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990), see Steven M. Wald, Note, The Left-For.
Dead Fiction of Corporate "Presence": Is It Revived by Burnham?, 54 La. L. Rev. 187 (1993).
86. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3) provides that:
Upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other unincorporated
association which is subject to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent
is one authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing
a copy to the defendant.
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The interplay of 4(d)(3) and the national contacts test is illustrated in First
Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp.87 In First Flight, the plaintiff
employed the defendant to transport a shipment of golf clubs from Chattanooga,
Tennessee, to Los Angeles, California."8 After First Flight received the golf
clubs and determined that they had been damaged during transit, it filed suit
against National Carloading in Tennessee under the Interstate Commerce Act.89
National Carloading moved to implead Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway
Company, which it had hired to transport the golf clubs for part of the distance
to California. Atchison's agent was served in accordance with Rule 4(d)(3) in
Tennessee at a small office that Atchison maintained for two of its employees.
Atchison argued that it lacked sufficient contacts with Tennessee to enable the
district court to assert jurisdiction. 90 However, the district court ruled that
Atchison's contacts with the forum state were irrelevant because its national
contacts satisfied due process.9 As the Ninth Circuit later explained in Wells
Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co.:92
[I]n a federal question suit, Rules 4(f)-providing for service within the
territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held, and
4(d)3-providing the manner for in-state service over foreign as well as
domestic corporations, in combination give the district court the power
and method of serving corporations which are present within the state
under all circumstances consistent with the due process limits .... 9'
Since the district court in First Flight did not require Atchison to have minimum
contacts with the forum state, due process served as the only limitation upon the
exercise of jurisdiction by the federal district court. Due process in a federal
question case requires only that a defendant have minimum contacts with the
United States in general. Whether the defendant has any contacts with the forum
state is constitutionally irrelevant.
Although Atchison was served within the forum state in First Flight, many
defendants are not physically present within the state where the federal district
court is located. As a result, federal district courts are often unable to use Rules
87. 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
88. Id. at 732.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 732-36.
91. The First Flight court explained: "In the present case it is believed that the Court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over Santa Fe. Santa Fe is incorporated within and does business
throughout much of the United States. There are thus the requisite minimum contacts with the
United States, and service has been made upon an acknowledged Santa Fe agent within the territorial
limits of the Court's process." Id. at 740. Since Rule 4(d)(3) authorized service on the defendant,
there was no need to borrow a state long-arm statute to accomplish service. Rule 4(e), by contrast,
does not provide an independent basis for service. Either a federal statute or a state long-arm statute
must provide the authority for service.
92. 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
93. Id. at 424 n.19 (citations omitted).
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4(d) and 4(f). Therefore, the court is required to look to Rule 4(e) for
authorization to serve process beyond the territorial limits of the forum state.
Rule 4(e) permits service in two circumstances: either in accordance with a
federal statute, or "under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by the
long-arm statute of the forum state.94
Some federal statutes that create a cause of action also authorize nationwide
service of process.95 The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
have determined that the strictures placed upon the service power of the federal
district courts by Rule 4(t) are lifted when a federal statute permits nationwide
service.9 In such situations, the service power of the district court becomes
"co-extensive with the boundaries of the United States,"97 and the defendant's
contacts with the state where the district court sits cease to be relevant.98 As
the Fifth Circuit explained in Federal Trade Commission v. Jim Walter Corp.:99
"[E]ach federal court exercises the 'judicial power of the United States,'....
[D]ue process requires only that a defendant in a federal suit have minimum
contacts with the United States, 'the sovereign that has created the
111100
court....,
The Ninth Circuit has held that the Clayton Actd o' and the Securities
Exchange Act' 02 authorize international service of process.0 3 The due pro-
cess inquiry is the same under a federal statute that permits world-wide service
of process as it would be under a federal statute that authorizes nationwide
94. See supra note I for the text of Rule 4(e).
95. Some of these statutes include: 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act), 29 U.S.C. § 132(e)2 (Employment Retirement Income Security Act), and Bankr.
Rule 7004(d), 11 U.S.C. (Bankruptcy).
96. See supra note 15.
97. FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
98. Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 1089, 111 S. Ct. 968 (1991) (Michigan defendant's contacts with Illinois irrelevant in
bankruptcy action); Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendants' contacts
with Arizona were irrelevant under the Securities Exchange Act); FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d
251, 256 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (defendant's contacts with Texas irrelevant in action under
Federal Trade Commission Act); Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 824-25 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949, 102 S. Ct. 1450 (1982) (under 28 U.S.C. § 1692, court-appointed
receiver could hale defendants into court in Tennessee even though defendants had no contacts with
Tennessee); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 n.4 (7th Cir. 1979) (Oklahoma defendant's
contacts with Illinois irrelevant under Securities Exchange Act); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138,
1142-43 (2d Cir. 1974) (Massachusetts resident's contacts with New York irrelevant under Securities
Act of 1934).
99. 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
100. Id. at 256 (citations and footnotes omitted).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 22.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78.
103. In Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit
permitted Japanese defendants to be served in Japan under the Clayton Act. In SEC v. International
Swiss, 895 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Securities Exchange
Act to permit service in Mexico.
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service of process; a defendant must have minimum contacts with the United
States in general. Of course, a statute that authorizes nationwide service of
process cannot be used to serve a defendant outside the United States. °4
Thus, there are two scenarios in which the federal district court must rely
upon a state long-arm statute to serve process upon a defendant in a federal
question case. The first is when the federal statute that creates the plaintiff's
cause of action does not provide an independent basis for service and the
defendant cannot be served within the forum state under Rule 4(d)(1) or Rule
4(d)(3) as permitted by Rule 4(f). The second is when the plaintiff's relief
is based upon a federal statute that permits nationwide, but not world-wide,
service of process and the defendant cannot be served within the United
States.' 06 When either of these two situations arise, the federal court must look
to Rule 4(e) for authorization to serve process. Rule 4(e) permits service "under
the circumstances" prescribed by the long-arm statute of the state where the
district court is located when there is no federal statute that can be used to
accomplish service.'
0 7
As stated above, the circuits are split over the meaning of the "under the
circumstances" language in Rule 4(e). The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have
determined that the language in Rule 4(e) refers to those circumstances
enumerated by the state long-arm statute in which service of process has been
authorized by the state legislature.'0 8 These two circuits have concluded that
if the state's long-arm statute allows service and the exercise of jurisdiction is
permitted by due process, then the district court may assert jurisdiction over the
defendant.
By contrast, the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
construed the "under the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e) to refer to the
circumstances in which a court of the state where the federal court is located can
104. For example, in United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d
1080, 1086 (1st Cir. 1992), the First Circuit held that the Massachusetts long-arm statute was the only
available means under Rule 4(e) to serve defendants in Scotland since ERISA permits nationwide
rather than world-wide service.
105. For example, in Lorelei Corp. v. County of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717, 720 (lst Cir. 1991),
the First Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1343 did not permit service beyond the state where the district
court was located. In Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth
Circuit held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for extra-territorial service of process.
106. See supra note 104. The First Circuit's discussion in United Elec. illustrates the difference
between a statute authorizing nationwide service and one that allows world-wide service. Where the
statute provides that "process may be served in any other district where a defendant resides or may
be found," the reference to "district" means that the statute authorizes nationwide service. United
Elec., 960 F.2d at 1086 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (1988)). By contrast, if the statute specifies
"that process may be served wherever a defendant is found" without reference to federal districts, the
statute authorizes world-wide service. Id. at 1086 n.6 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1988)).
107. See supra note I for the text of Rule 4(e).
108. Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Oil
Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992); United Rope Distribs. v. Seatriumph Marine,
930 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1991).
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exercise personal jurisdiction."° This interpretation requires the federal district
court to pretend it is a state court for the purpose of attaining in personam
jurisdiction even though federal law provides the basis for the plaintiffs relief.
As the Fifth Circuit explained in DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 0 service of
process and personal jurisdiction are distinct concepts. "Amenability to
jurisdiction means that a defendant is within the substantive reach of a forum's
jurisdiction under applicable law. Service of process is simply the physical
means by which that jurisdiction is asserted.'
As the Supreme Court noted in Omni, the defendant must be amenable to
service before a court may exercise jurisdiction."' Thus, service of process
must be accomplished before a court may exercise jurisdiction. Since the
majority of the circuits have interpreted Rule 4(e) to require that a defendant
have minimum contacts with the state, the district court is precluded from
asserting jurisdiction over a defendant who lacks minimum contacts with the
forum state, even the exercise of jurisdiction would satisfy due process because
the defendant has minimum contacts with the United States in general.
Next, this comment will examine the cases in which the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits determined that the "under the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require that the defendant have
minimum contacts with the forum state.
IV. THE MINORITY VIEW
A. The Sixth Circuit
In Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.," 3 the Sixth Circuit
concluded that an analysis of the defendant's contacts with the forum state was
unnecessary when the defendant was served under the state long-arm statute in
a federal question case. The Sixth Circuit interpreted the "under the circum-
stances" language in Rule 4(e) to refer to those acts or omissions listed in the
state long-arm statute in which the state legislature has authorized service of
process." 4  The court determined that the defendant could be served with
109. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st
Cir. 1992); Lorelei Corp. v. County of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717, 720 (1st Cir. 1991); Max
Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 295-97 (3d Cir. 1985); DeJames v. Magnificence
Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284-86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085, 102 S. Ct. 642 (1981);
Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Damodar Bulk Carriers,
Ltd., 903 F.2d 675, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1990); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d
406, 418 (9th Cir..1977); Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829,
855-56 & n.39 (11th Cir. 1990).
110. 711 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1983).
111. Id. at 1264 (citation omitted).
112. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987).
113. 732 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1984).
114. Id. at 1272.
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process because the plaintiff's claim arose from the acts of the defendant in
"contracting to supply services or goods in this Commonwealth" in accordance
with the Kentucky long-arm statute. 15 Since the Kentucky long-arm statute
had been interpreted to reach as far as was constitutionally permissible," 6 the
court reasoned that the long-arm statute could be used to serve process upon a
defendant in a federal question case who had minimum contacts with the United
States." 7 Under this analysis, the Sixth Circuit concluded that personal
jurisdiction could be exercised over the defendant even though the defendant did
not have minimum contacts with the state." 8
B. The Seventh Circuit
After Omni was decided, the Seventh Circuit indicated in United Rope
Distributors, Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine, Corp."9 that it agreed with the Sixth
Circuit's conclusion that the "under the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e)
does not require a federal district court to weigh the defendant's contacts with
the forum state:
"[U]nder the circumstances" is a slim thread on which to hang a
conclusion that federal courts exercising national powers should pretend
that they are state courts exercising state powers .... The language
more naturally refers to the "circumstances" identified in the state
statutes. Federal courts acquire personal jurisdiction only to the extent
that state law authorizes service of process. When the state law
authorizes this service, . . . the federal court has jurisdiction unless the
Constitution bars the door. 2 °
However, the Seventh Circuit's statements in United Rope are dicta since the
plaintiff had asked the court to fashion a common-law rule to serve process. As
the court stated, "Omni closed that route decisively.''
In In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz,122 the Seventh Circuit adopted its earlier
reasoning in UnitedRope when it held that the "under the circumstances" language
in Rule 4(e) did not require a defendant who had been served in accordance with
a state long-arm statute in a federal question case to have minimum contacts with
the forum, state. The court stated: "The requirement of minimum contacts is
intended to ensure that the sovereign possesses a legitimate claim to assert power
115. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 454.210(2)(a)(2), quoted in Handley, 732 F.2d at 1270.
116. Handley, 732 F.2d at 1271 (citing Poyner v. Erma Werke GMBH. 618 F.2d 1186, 1192
(6th Cir. 1980)).
117. Id. at 1272.
118. Id.
119. 930 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1991).
120. Id. at 536.
121. Id.
122. 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).'
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over the defendant. When the national sovereign is applying national law, the
relevant contacts are the contacts between the defendant and the sovereign's
nation.' 23 Since the court had determined that service was authorized by the
state long-arm statute, it held that due process would permit it to consider the
aggregate of the defendant's contacts with New York and Illinois to determine if
the exercise of jurisdiction was fair.' 24
In Stauffacher v. Bennett, 2 the plaintiff alleged violations of the Securities
Exchange Act, Wisconsin law, and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO). 26 The Seventh Circuit engaged in a separate jurisdictional inquiry
for each of the plaintiff s claims. The court interpreted the Securities Exchange Act
to authorize world-wide service of process if "the defendants have the same
contacts with the United States as they would have to have with Wisconsin ...
under the 'presence' theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction.' 27
Although the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Canadian defendant's contacts
with the United States were insufficient for the federal district court to exercise
jurisdiction, 2 ' it is unclear from the opinion what the Seventh Circuit meant by
its reference to the "presence theory" of extraterritorialjurisdiction. Since the court
had determined earlier in the opinion that the plaintiff's injury did not arise from
the defendant's activities in the forum, perhaps the Seventh Circuit meant that due
process would require the defendant to have more than "minimum contacts" with
the United States since the plaintiff's cause of action was unrelated to the forum.
This reading of the opinion would be consistent with the Supreme Court's decision
in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,129 a diversity case. The
Supreme Court held in Helicopteros that due process requires the defendant's
contacts with the forum to be "continuous and systematic," in accordance with
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 30 when the plaintiff's cause of
action does not arise out of the defendant's activities within the forum.'
3
'
With respect to the allegations of fraud under Wisconsin law, the Seventh
Circuit considered whether the defendants were amenable to service under the
Wisconsin long-arm statute. The court concluded that the defendants could not be
served because their activities in the state were not "substantial" in accordance with
the Wisconsin long-arm statute.32
In its discussion of the RICO claim, the Seventh Circuit noted that only
nationwide, not world-wide, service of process was authorized by RICO.'33
123. Id. at 1294 (citation omitted).
124. Id.
125. 969 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1992).
126. Id. at 457.
127. Id. at 461 (citations omitted).
128. Id.
129. 466 U.S. 408, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
130. 342 U.S. 437, 72 S. Ct. 413 (1952).
131. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416, 104 S. Ct. at 1873.
132. Stauffacher, 969 F.2d at 457.
133. Id. at 460-61.
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Therefore, the court reasoned that the Wisconsin long-arm statute must be used to
accomplish service upon the alien defendants in Canada. However, the court then
stated that "the analysis [on the RICO claim] is as above [on the state fraud
claim]."' 34 It is unclear from the opinion what the Seventh Circuit meant by
"analysis." Although consistent with the Seventh Circuit's opinions in United Rope
and Amoco Cadiz as to whether the state long-arm statute in a federal question case
must authorize service upon the defendant, the Seventh Circuit's Stauffacher
opinion conflicts with the earlier determination in United Rope and Amoco Cadiz
that the jurisdictional inquiry is different in a federal question case than when the
plaintiffs relief is founded upon state law.'35
However, the distinction between federal question cases and diversity cases
may reconcile Stauffacher with United Rope and Amoco Cadiz. In Stauffacher, the
Seventh Circuit characterized the plaintiff s cause of action as "mainly fraud and
other violations of Wisconsin state law ... garnished with RICO and federal
securities claims." ''  Such a characterization leads to the conclusion that the
court based its subject matter jurisdiction upon diversity of citizenship rather than
upon the existence of a federal question. As the Supreme Court stated in American
Well Works v. Layne & Bowler Co.,37 "A suit arises under the law that creates
the cause of action."'
38
Perhaps Stauffacher indicates that the Seventh Circuit is unwilling to permit
the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction to the fullest extent that is consistent with
due process when the federal claims asserted by the plaintiff are incidental to the
plaintiff's state law claims and state law provides the principal basis for the
plaintiff's relief. When the plaintiff's cause of action is based primarily upon a
state law claim as in Stauffacher, the plaintiffs case arguably does not "arise
under" the constitution or federal law; therefore, the plaintiffs case should be
classified as a diversity case, a9 which would require the defedant to have
minimum contacts with the state. 4 '
V. THE MAJORITY VIEW
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits are two of the five circuits that have explicitly
held that an aggregation of the defendant's national contacts is permitted by due
134. Id. at 461.
135. United Rope Distribs. v. Seatriumph Marine, 930 F.2d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 1991). In re Oil
Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
136. Stauffacher, 969 F.2d at 457.
137. 241 U.S. 257, 36 S. Ct. 585 (1916).
138. Id. at 260, 36 S. Ct. at 586.
139. As the Supreme Court stated in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,
"[allthough the constitutional meaning of 'arising under' may extend to all cases in which a federal
question is 'an ingredient' of the action, we have long construed the statutory grant of federal-
question jurisdiction as conferring more limited power." 478 U.S. 804, 807, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3232
(1986).
140. See supra note 10.
19931
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
process. Thus, the defendant must only have minimum contacts with the United
States in general to satisfy constitutional requirements. 4 , However, these two
circuits, in addition to the First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits, have concluded that
when a defendant is served in accordance with a state long-arm statute in a federal
question case, the "under the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e) imposes a state
standard of amenability to jurisdiction. 42 As the Fifth Circuit stated in Burstein
v. State Bar of California,43 "the clear import of the 'under the circumstances'
language" in Rule 4(e) is that a federal district court, "even in a federal question
case, can use a state long-arm statute only to reach those parties whom a court of
the state could also reach under it."'" Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in Go-Video,
Inc. v. Akai Electric Co. ' 45 interpreted Omni to compel this determination.'
46
The First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that the
"under the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e) requires a two-step jurisdictional
analysis: First, the state long-arm statute must allow the district court to exercise
jurisdiction over the defendant. Second, the defendant must have sufficient contacts
with the forum state so that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be consistent
with due process. 47
VI. THE PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES WITH SERVICE UNDER RULE 4(E)
A. Obtaining Jurisdiction Over Alien Defendants
As interpreted by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the "under the circumstances"
language of Rule 4(e) does not require an alien defendant to possess minimum
contacts with the state where the district court is located. Thus, under the minority
view, that the defendant lacks minimum contacts with the forum state will not
141. FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981); Semegen v.
Weidner. 780 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1986).
142. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1086 (1st
Cir. 1992); Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 291 (3d Cir. 1985); Burstein v. State
Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Damodar Bulk Carriers, Ltd. 903 F.2d
675, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1990); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th
Cir. 1977).
143. 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
144. Id. at 514.
145. 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989).
146. Id. at 1416.
147. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st
Cir. 1992); Lorelei Corp. v. County of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717 (1st Cir. 1991); Johnson Creative
Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir. 1984); Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R.
Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 295-97 (3d Cir. 1985); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280,
284-86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085, 102 S. Ct. 642 (1981); Burstein v. State Bar of
California, 693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Damodar Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 903 F.2d 675, 678-
79 (9th Cir. 1990); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir.
1977); Chem Lab Prods., Inc. v. Stepanek, 554 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1977); Cable/Home Communica-
tion Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855-56 & n.39 (1lth Cir. 1990).
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prevent the court from exercising jurisdiction. However, the minority's view does
require that service be authorized by the long-arm statute of the forum state. Thus,
if the language of the long-arm statute does not authorize service of process on the
defendant, then the plaintiff will have to select a forum located in a state where the
language of the long-arm statute authorizes service. 4
Rule 4(e) as interpreted by a majority of the circuits grants to many alien
defendants immunity from suit in the United States. Under the first prong of the
two-part test developed by the majority, the alien defendant may escapejurisdiction
because the state long-arm is statutorily insufficient to allow the district court to
obtain jurisdiction over him. Alternatively, the defendant's national contacts may
be so scattered that they do not meet the minimum contacts threshold in any one
state.'49 If an American plaintiff wishes to seek relief in either of these two
situations, the majority's interpretation of Rule 4(e) requires him to sue in a foreign
tribunal even though the aggregate of the alien defendant's national contacts would
be sufficient to satisfy due process. As the dissent in Point Landing stated:
In this federal question case, the effect of the majority's decision is to
grant jurisdictional immunity to alien defendants who have done business
in this country thereby destroying any real possibility of holding them
accountable for their violation of federal statutes. This immunity is
granted in spite of defendants' apparently extensive contacts throughout
the country, because the defendants' contacts in Louisiana where the suit
was filed, are so minimal that the state's long-arm statute cannot be used
for service of process, under traditional International Shoe principles. 5
B. Under Both the Majority and Minority Views, Rule 4(e) Prevents the
Uniform Application of Federal Law
As interpreted by all of the circuits, Rule 4(e) may also prevent the uniform
application of federal law. As the district court in Edwin J. Moriarty & Co. v.
General Tire & Rubber Co.131 noted, the uniform application of federal law is
undermined by the incorporation of a state standard of amenability to jurisdiction:
"[I]n a case where the cause of action rests upon a federally-created right, ....
national uniformity in enforcing that right should be the true guideline."' 52 Under
the view adopted by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, service upon a defendant may
148. Marilyn J. Berger, Acquiring In Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases:
Procedural Frustration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 285, 308-10
(1982).
149. Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional
Standard, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 470, 475 (1981).
150. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415,427 (5th Cir. 1986) (Wisdom,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
151. 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Oh. 1967).
152. Id. at 389.
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be authorized by the long-arm statute of one state, but not by the long-arm statute
of another state. Since service of process is a necessary pre-condition to the
exercise of jurisdiction, the federal courts are unable to compel defendants who
cannot be served to comply with federal law.153 Therefore, variations in the
service power of the federal courts could result in the non-uniform enforcement of
federal law.
Under the first part of the test adopted by the majority of the circuits, the long-
arm statute of the state where a federal court is located may be statutorily
insufficient to reach a particular defendant. However, a district court that sits in a
state with a more liberal long-arm statute will be able to assert jurisdiction over the
same defendant.154 The two-step test applied by the majority of the circuits that
prevents the uniform application of federal law is illustrated in the following
example: in Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., the New
Hampshire long-arm statute permitted the district court to assert jurisdiction over
a German defendant who had participated in a conspiracy to violate the anti-trust
laws of the United States. 5 6 However, in LS. Joseph Co. v. Mannesmann Pipe
& Steel Corp.,57 another plaintiff filed suit against the same defendant on the
same cause of action in a federal district court that sat in Minnesota. But in 1.S.
Joseph, the defendant was not subject to suit because the Minnesota long-arm
statute did not statutorily allow service on the defendant and the defendant did not
have minimum contacts with Minnesota.
158
VII. THE FEDERALISM CONCERNS THAT JUSTIFY THE ADOPTION OF A STATE
STANDARD OF AMENABILITY TO JURISDICTION IN A DIVERSITY CASE ARE
ABSENT IN A FEDERAL QUESTION CASE
When a federal district court exercises diversity jurisdiction, state law, rather
than federal law, provides the basis for the plaintiff's relief.'59 Since state law is
to be applied by the federal district court, there are federalism concerns that justify
the incorporation of a state standard of amenability to jurisdiction. As the Supreme
Court stated in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,16° "[A] federal court adjudicating a
state-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for
that purpose, in effect, only another court of the State."' 16' Moreover, the federal
district court that sits in diversity "must ensure that the forum state does not unduly
153. Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 12.69 (6th Cir. 1984).
154. See Berger, supra note 148, at 308-10.
155. 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977).
156. Id. at 659.
157. 408 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Minn. 1976).
158. Id. at 1025.
159. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S. Ct. 817, 822 (1938); 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
160. 326 U.S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945).
161. Id. at 108-09, 65 S. Ct. 1469-70.
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encroach on a sister state's interests."'62 Also, as the Seventh Circuit observed,
"State-federal jurisdictional allocations would be thrown out of kilter if a federal
court could give judgment in a diversity case that the state itself would have to
dismiss.""16
However, the federalism concerns thatjustify the imposition of a state standard
of amenability to jurisdiction in diversity cases are absent in federal question
cases."6 As the Sixth Circuit noted in Handley, when a federal court exercises
federal question jurisdiction, "'the federalism issue is of no relevance, for the court
determines the parties' rights and liabilities under uniform, national law. No state
intrudes on another's interests. The only relevant interest is the national one.""1
65
Since the "under the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e) as interpreted by all
of the circuits places some restrictions upon the service power of the federal courts,
Congress could rectify this situation by adopting a provision that authorizes world-
wide service of process in all federal question litigation.'
VIII. WORLD-WIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS
Although it may seem that enacting a world-wide service of process statute will
result in a tremendous burden for the United States federal courts, there are three
safeguards that can protect against this. First, federal questionjurisdiction will only
exist if the suit "aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
162. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 292 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbens, J.,
dissenting).
163. United Rope Distribs. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1991).
164. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (lst
Cir. 1992); Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 1985).
165. Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1269 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting
DeJames, 654 F.2d at 292 (Gibbens, J., dissenting)).
166. See supra notes 6 & 148. In April of 1993, the United States Supreme Court proposed
Rule 4(K)(2) which will allow a federal district court in a federal question case to exercise personal
jurisdiction over an alien defendant who has sufficient national contacts to satisfy due process,
provided that the defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the courts of general jurisdiction
in any state. Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 416 (1993). Proposed Rule 4(K)(2)
provides:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, serving a summons is also effective, with respect to claims arising under federal
law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.
Id. Although the effect of this revision will ensure American plaintiffs a domestic forum in which
they can sue an alien defendant who has minimum contacts with the United States, service under
Proposed Rule 4(K)(2) is only available if the defendant cannot be served under any state long-arm
statute. It could be expensive to prove that Proposed Rule 4(K)(2) is the only method available to
serve the defendant. Gary B. Born and Andrew N. Vollmer, The Effect of the Revised Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure on Personal Jurisdiction, Service, and Discovery in International Cases, 150
F.R.D. 221, 227 (1993). For this reason, a federal statute that allows world-wide service in all federal
cases would be preferable.
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States." 167 All other cases will be deemed to be diversity suits in which the
defendant must have minimum contacts with the state. 68 Second, if the cause of
action does not arise out of the defendant's activities within the United States, due
process requires that his contacts with the United States be "continuous and
systematic. '1 69 Thus, the defendant's national contacts must be more than just
"minimum." Finally, even if the defendant has sufficient contacts with the United
States to satisfy due process, the federal district court can invoke the forum non
conveniens doctrine and decline to hear the suit if it is of the opinion that the action
would be more appropriately brought in the alien defendant's country.
70
A federal statute that allows world-wide service would empower the federal
district courts in federal question cases to exercise jurisdiction over any defendant
whose national contacts satisfied due process. Since the state jurisdictional lines
drawn by Ru le 4(f) and the "under the circumstances" language of Rule 4(e) would
only apply in diversity suits, there would be no need for the district court in a
federal question case to consider whether the state long-arm statute authorized
service upon the defendant or to weigh the defendant's contacts with the forum
state. This federal statute would enable American plaintiffs to sue alien defendants
in the United States if their national contacts satisfied due process. Moreover, a
federal statute permitting international service would promote the uniform
application of federal law. A federal statute that authorizes world-wide service of
process is desirable because it would free federal courts from state jurisdictional
constraints in federal question cases. However, as will be discussed below, the
enactment of such a statute without a revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c) will promote
forum shopping by allowing plaintiffs to institute federal question suits against
corporate defendants in any district in this country.
IX. CORPORATE VENUE WILL ALLOW FORUM-SHOPPING WITH A WORLD-WIDE
SERVICE OF PROCESS STATUTE
In a federal question case, venue is proper wherever a defendant resides under
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). '7 According to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), a corporation is-
deemed to reside in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.'72 A
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
168. See supra note 10.
169. Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445, 72 S. Ct. 413, 418 (1952).
170. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 102 S. Ct. 252 (1981).
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (1988) states: "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded
solely on citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial
district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State."
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988) provides:
For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be
deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at
the time the action is commenced. In a State which has more than one judicial district
and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the
time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district
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federal statute that authorizes world-wide service of process would enable every
federal district court in this country to assert in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant who has minimum contacts with the United States. As a result, venue
would be proper for corporate defendants in every district under 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b)(1) and (c).173
Although the outcome of a federal question case is theoretically supposed to
be the same regardless of where the suit is filed, in practice, different forums tend
to produce different results. These differences may encourage plaintiffs to shop for
the forum that offers the most favorable outcome. The combined effect of 28
U.S.C. 1391(b)(1) and (c) with a world-wide service of process provision would
allow plaintiffs to choose any federal district in the country as the locale for their
suit.
Many federal statutes are silent with respect to prescription, and the Supreme
Court has held that the most analogous prescriptive period from state law should
be borrowed when Congress has failed to provide a statute of limitations in a
federal statute.174 Of course, differing statutes of limitations can encourage forum
shopping. In Wilson v. Garcia,75 the Supreme Court held that the prescriptive
period from state personal injury statutes should be borrowed if the plaintiff's suit
is instituted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.76 The result of Wilson is that a section
1983 action that borrows the Louisiana statute of limitations will prescribe in one
year under Louisiana Civil Code article 3492.177 But, a section 1983 action that
incorporates the Mississippi statutes of limitations will prescribe in three years. 71
Another circumstance in which it would be advantageous for the plaintiff to
forum-shop is where the federal courts differ in their interpretation of a particular
federal statute. For example, the Ninth Circuit has determined that the doctrine of
respondeat superior is not available to establish liability under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.179 By contrast, the Second Circuit has held that
respondeat superior can be used to prove liability under the same statute. "0
in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal
jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is no such district, the
corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most
significant contacts.
173. Two district courts have allowed the definition of corporate residence in 28 U.S.C. 1391(c)
to define "residence" in a special venue statute that is accompanied by a provision authorizing
nationwide service of process. Obee v. Teleshare, 725 F. Supp. 913, 916-17 (E.D. Mich. 1989);
Kingsepp v. Wesleyan University, 763 F. Supp. 22, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
174. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (1985); Automobile
Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705-06, 86 S. Ct. 1107, 1113 (1960).
175. 471 U.S. 261, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).
176. Id. at 266-67, 105 S. Ct. at 1941-42.
177. Detro v. Roemer, 739 F. Supp. 303, 305 (E.D. La. 1990).
178. Flowers v. Dickens, 741 F. Supp. 112, 113 n.1 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
179. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1975).
180. Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980).
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If the plaintiff files suit in a distant or inconvenient forum to obtain the
advantage of a longer statute of limitations or a more favorable interpretation of a
federal law, the defendant can move to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a).' 8 ' However, the defendant bears the burden of convincing the court that
the "interests of justice" require a transfer of the case to a more convenient
forum. 18 2  As the Supreme Court stated in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,18 3
"[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed." ' 84 Moreover, if the defendant is denied his
request for a venue transfer at the trial level, there is little chance of reversal on
appeal since the appellate court must find that the trial judge abused his discre-
tion. '
The Supreme Court in Van Dusen v. Barrack'8 6 held that a venue transfer
sought by the defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) in a diversity case is only a
change of courtrooms; therefore, the law to be applied in the case is not affected by
the venue transfer. 8 7 The lower federal courts, however, are split over whether
a transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) results in a change of law in a federal
question case.
When the plaintiff's cause of action is founded upon a federal statute that does
not include a prescriptive period, and the statute of limitations must be borrowed
from the law of the forum state, two district courts have concluded that a venue
transfer does not affect the prescriptive period. In Thorn v. New York City
Department of Social Services,'88 the plaintiff commenced her suit in a district
court located in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff's petition alleged violations of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff's suit had been timely instituted under the prescriptive
period that was borrowed from Pennsylvania law. Nevertheless, the defendant
successfully moved to transfer the suit to New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Since the plaintiffs cause of action would have prescribed under the applicable
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) states: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought."
182. Nelson v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 747 F. Supp. 532, 535 (D. Minn. 1990); Schieffelin &
Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca. 725 F. Supp. 1314, 1321 (S.D.N.Y 1989); Sackett v. Denver & Rio Grande
W. R.R., 603 F. Supp. 260, 261 (D. Col. 1985); Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F.
Supp. 131, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Cambridge Filter Corp. v. Int'l Filter Co., 548 F. Supp. 1308, 1310
(D. Nev. 1982).
183. 330 U.S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839 (1947).
184. Id. at 508, 67 S. Ct. at 843.
185. Scheidt v. Klein, 956 F.2d 963, 965 (10th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 934 F.2d 1193, 1196 (11th Cir. 1991); Jarvis Christian College v. Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523,
528 (5th Cir. 1988); Red Bull Assocs. v. Best Western Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988);
Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988); Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426,
430 (9th Cir. 1987); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1987);
Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 985 (7th Cir. 1986).
186. 376 U.S. 612, 84 S. Ct. 805 (1964).
187. Id. at 639, 84 S. Ct. at 821.
188. 523 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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New York statute of limitations, the defendant maintained that the plaintiff's suit
should be dismissed. 89 The court held that "[i]n determining the timeliness of
Mrs. Thorn's section 1983 claims, this court must resolve the issue as it would have
been resolved by the original forum, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania."'" In
Brick v. Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust,19' the district court had reached the
same conclusion.1
92
The decisions in Thorn and Brick are consistent with the Supreme Court's
opinion in Ferens v. John Deere,93 a diversity case. In Ferens, the plaintiff was
injured in Pennsylvania as the result of a defect in the defendant's tractor. Since
John Deere was a corporation that engaged in business throughout the country, it
had enough contacts with Mississippi for the exercise of jurisdiction to satisfy due
process.'94 The plaintiff had chosen to commence the suit in Mississippi to take
advantage of the Mississippi statute of limitations and Mississippi tort law. The
plaintiff successfully moved to transfer venue to Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a). The defendant argued that the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed because
prescription had accrued under Pennsylvania tort law. The Supreme Court held that
Mississippi tort law, including the statute of limitations, was to be applied as if the
plaintiff's suit-had remained in Mississippi. Since the plaintiff's cause of action
had not prescribed under Mississippi law, the plaintiff was allowed to continue his
suit in Pennsylvania.'95
By contrast, two district courts have determined that the case law of the circuit
where the plaintiff's suit was commenced was not binding upon the transferee court
when there was a change of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The plaintiffs in
Isaac v. Life Investors Insurance Co. of America96 had originally filed suit in a
federal district court in Alabama.. The defendant's motion to transfer the case to
Tennessee was granted by the Alabama district court. The issue before the
Tennessee court was whether the plaintiffs' state law claims had been preempted
by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The Eleventh
Circuit, whose decisions bind the Alabama transferor court, had determined that
ERISA had preempted the plaintiff's state law claims. However, the Sixth Circuit,
whose decisions bind the Tennessee district court, had not yet ruled upon the
preemption issue. The Tennessee district court held that Van Dusen did not
obligate it to follow the law of the Eleventh Circuit. "[W]hile the law of the
transferor forum on federal issues merits close consideration, it is not binding on
the transferee forum. Instead, each circuit must engage in independent analysis of
189. Id. at 1199.
190. Id. at 1197.
191. 442 F. Supp. 283 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
192. Id. at 299.
193. 494 U.S. 516, 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990).
194. 494 U.S. at 520, 110 S. Ct. at 1278.
195. 494 U.S. at 519-20, 108 S. Ct. at 1278.
196. 749 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Tenn. 1990).
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the issue, and it is only that circuit's decisions along with the Supreme Court, which
bind the district courts in that circuit."'
197
As stated above, in Van Dusen, the Supreme Court had held that the same law
where the plaintiff filed his suit should be applied in the forum where the suit is
transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.198 The Isaac court concluded that the Van
Dusen decision intended to prevent a defendant in a diversity case from using a
venue transfer to avoid having the case decided under the law of the state where the
plaintiff had filed suit. Since state law is not at issue in a federal question case, the
Isaac court determined that Van Dusen was not applicable '9
The district court's conclusion in Scheinbart v. Certain-Teed Products2°° was
the same as that reached by the Isaac court when it determined whether a change
of venue should be granted. The plaintiff had argued that the court should not grant
the defendant's request for a venue transfer because the law in the Second Circuit
where the suit was brought was more favorable than the law in the Third Circuit,
to which her case would be transferred 20'
Perhaps Thorn and Brick can be distinguished from Isaac and Scheinbart.
Allowing a plaintiff to continue a suit that had been timely instituted in the original
forum under a borrowed state statute of limitations does not require a district court
to follow the law of a federal circuit court which is not in its direct chain of review
or to adopt an analysis that may be in conflict with the case law of the circuit court
that reviews its decisions.
A world-wide service of process statute would make venue proper in a suit
against a corporate defendant in every federal district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)1
and (c). Before a federal statute is enacted that authorizes world-wide service of
process, the definition of corporate residence in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c) for domestic
corporations should be revised to prevent forum shopping by plaintiffs which will
subject corporate defendants to inconvenient litigation. As the court in Energy
Resources Group, Inc. v. Energy Resources Corp.2 2 stated: "The venue statutes
were devised to achieve two basic purposes: to lay venue in a place having a
logical connection with the parties to the litigation, and to afford the defendant
some protection against the hardship of having to litigate in some distant
place. 20 3
If in federal questions suits, residence for domestic corporations was defined
as the state where a corporation was incorporated, then venue would be proper in
only one district, rather than in every district where the corporation is subject to
personal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. This venue revision would curtail
197. Id. at 863.
198. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 1469-70
(1945).
199. Isaac, 749 F. Supp. at 863.
200. 367 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
201. Id. at 710-11.
202. 297 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
203. Id. at 233.
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forum shopping. Venue for alien corporate defendants would not change, however,
because it would remain proper in every district of the country under 28 U.S.C. §
1391(d).2° 4 Also, venue would remain proper in the district where "a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred" under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)2 or wherever the defendant is "found" under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)3.205
X. CONCLUSION
As Judge Wisdom stated in Point Landing, "A federal court's service arm in
a federal question case should not be handcuffed to the place of the court's
seat." 206 Federal courts should not be required to rely upon long-arm statutes
enacted by state legislatures to acquire jurisdiction over defendants in federal
causes of action. A federal statute authorizing world-wide service of process would
allow American federal courts to obtain jurisdiction in federal question cases over
alien defendants who possess sufficient contacts with the United States to satisfy
due process. Moreover, a world-wide service of process statute will promote the
uniform application of federal law, which will enhance its effectiveness.
Lisa Rouchell
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) states: "An alien may be sued in any district."
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely upon diversity of citizenship may
... be brought ... in (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred ... or (3) a judicial district in which any
defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be
brought.
206. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 428 (5th Cir. 1986) (Wisdom,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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